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INTRODUCTION
Jose Figueroa’s case presented “little out of the ordinary” for
the federal courts.1 His was a “multimillion-dollar” drug operation
run out of Wisconsin that fell apart when a dealer and a partner
flipped and gave testimony for the government.2 Only in the closing moments of sentencing3 did Figueroa’s case take an unusual
turn, one that would in due course elicit an unusual opinion from
Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In the
process of assigning Figueroa to the “low end of Figueroa’s advisory guidelines range,”4 District Court Judge Rudolph T. Randa
also offered, sua sponte, a “lengthy and disconnected lecture” that
“sap[ped]” the appellate court’s “confidence” in the sentencing’s
integrity.5 Central to Judge Randa’s ex tempore peroration was
the observation that “Figueroa [was] of Mexican descent.”6 This
led him to “comment[ ] about Mexico and . . . Mexico’s contribution to drug and immigration issues in the United States. ‘The
southwest is being overwhelmed,’ the judge remarked,” before
“lash[ing] out at illegal immigration, occasionally referring to ‘you
people’ or ‘those people.’”7 Exercising a characteristic measure of
delicacy and tact, Judge Wood characterized these remarks by
Judge Randa’s comments as showing “an odd focus on nationstates and national characteristics”8 and as falling short of the
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1
United States v Figueroa, 622 F3d 739, 740 (7th Cir 2010).
2
Id at 740–41.
3
Figueroa was convicted of two counts under the Controlled Substances Act: one for
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and one for distribution of cocaine.
Id at 741.
4
Id at 740.
5
Figueroa, 622 F3d at 743.
6
Id.
7
Id. There’s more, but you get the idea.
8
Id.
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rule that a sentencing court “adequately explain” its judgment.9
Her majority opinion held back, though, from determining
whether mere invocation of Figueroa’s “national origin, standing
alone, would require reversal.”10
Judge Wood’s opinion in United States v Figueroa11 passes
through a sort of double movement in relation to the idea of national origin discrimination. On the one hand, it toys with the
possibility that the sentencing judge’s invocation of Figueroa’s
Mexican origin—as distinct, apparently, from his race, his ethnicity, or his citizenship or immigration status—played a motivating
role in the analysis. But it was not an adequate or rational explanation, Judge Wood implied, to invoke a person’s nationality as a
ground for imposing a sentence upon them. Indeed, it is not hard
to infer that reliance on nationality would not just be irrational,
but also a distinctly constitutional wrong—a “suspect classification” in the argot of equal protection law.12
But on the other hand, there is a pulling back in Judge
Wood’s opinion from the implications of this position. At the cusp
of giving a constitutional analysis, she veers abruptly away from
characterizing Judge Randa as animated by animosity toward
Figueroa because of his national origin. The opinion also holds
back from elucidating what, exactly, is problematic about the invocation of a defendant’s national origin, or indeed the predicate
step of explaining what counts as a national origin in the first
instance. (Would different legal or normative concerns have been
raised had the district court labeled Figueroa “Latino” or “Central
American”? “Hispanic”? “Of a distinct race?” Does it matter that,
in common parlance, these labels might be imprecisely used in an
interchangeable way with national origin?) The result of this double movement is a published opinion gesturing toward, without
substantiating or explaining, a distinctive moral and legal harm
from national origin discrimination.
Perhaps this explanatory lacuna is inconsequential; perhaps
the harm of national origin discrimination is obvious. I think not.
To the contrary, I think we should not rush to assume either that
national origin discrimination is either conceptually clear or

9

Figueroa, 622 F3d at 744, quoting Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 50 (2007).
Figueroa, 622 F3d at 744. Concurring, Judge Terence Evans suggested that Judge
Randa’s actions may have been a “no harm-no foul situation” because the sentence imposed was at the low end of the guidelines range. Id at 745 (Evans concurring).
11 622 F3d 739 (7th Cir 2010).
12 See note 16 (collecting sources).
10
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clearly unwarranted. To see this, take up once again the facts of
Figueroa’s case. Glossing his sentencing speech with a surfeit of
(probably unearned) interpretive generosity, we might characterize
Judge Randa as offering a view about the expected distribution of
narcotics dealers by formal nationality as indexed by one’s passport. With a charity verging on inculpating complicity, we might
even understand him to be saying that the expected general deterrent effect of a sentence would be greater because Figueroa’s punishment would have special communicative value for his cohort as
defined by national origin rather than by criminality.13
The argument for this interpretation might run as follows:
The epistemic and moral functions of national origin are distinct
from their analogs in the race and gender context. Punishing one
individual has a general deterrence effect on his or her cohort as
defined by nationality; no such general deterrence effect when
race is in play. Moreover, it might be argued, while certain nationality groups have been subject to persistent patterns of historical
discrimination,14 not every one has been an object of calumny in
the past.15 No national-identity category, indeed, has played the
shaping role in US society and law associated with either racial
or gender identities. It’s not obvious, the argument would go, that
we should view national origin discrimination as a distinctive
kind of moral or legal wrong akin to racial or gender discrimination. Instead, it is more akin to “merely” irrational preferences
such as a dislike of people with green eyes, large ears, or precisely
beveled mannerisms. As a result, it is not obvious—whether as a
matter of originalist method, doctrinal casuistry, or ordinary
moral logic—that we should utter national origin in the same condemnatory breath as race or gender given its distinctive historical
specificity, phenomenological heterogeneity, and conceptual ambiguity. On this view, Judge Randa did nothing wrong invoking
Figueroa’s national origin. And so there was no cause for the
13

For an argument that this form of “collective sanction” can be defended independent
of any entanglement with race or ethnicity, see Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56
Stan L Rev 345, 348, 376–86 (2003) (“Group members might be punished not because they
are deemed collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control responsible individuals, and can be
motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so.”).
14 See, for example, Erika Lee, The Making of Asian America: A History 89–108 (Simon
& Schuster 2015) (charting discrimination against Chinese Americans back to the 1800s).
15 For an analysis of how different ethnic and national origin groups have navigated
the color line after emigration, see generally David Roediger, Working Toward Whiteness:
How America’s Immigrants Became White; The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the
Suburbs (Basic 2005).
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse his actions—and
nothing that court said suggests otherwise. Or so the argument
would go.
The aim of this short Essay—part of a Festschrift to celebrate
Judge Diane Wood—is to explore the role that national origin discrimination plays in the US jurisprudence of equality. The double
movement of the Figueroa opinion, I will suggest, provides a clue
that this role is not a well-defined or closely theorized one. Although
my argument is at points critical of the doctrine’s structure and
application, I should be clear up front that the inspiration for the
Essay—Judge Wood’s opinion—is not the object of any of that criticism. To the contrary, that opinion is exemplary of a sensitive
and mindful jurisprudence that accounts carefully for the complex effects that pejorative stereotypes and structural dynamics
of stratification can play in constraining life choices. The ambivalence of the Figueroa opinion is instead productive. It invites inquiry into questions close to the heart of one of the Constitution’s
central moral commitments: Why should discrimination of a
given sort contravene the equal protection commitments lodged
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? How fungible are the
suspect classifications? And when should courts enforce a rule of
strict scrutiny beyond the usual suspects? Again, to be clear up
front, I do think that national origin discrimination is constitutionally problematic. But I also think we have no clear explanation why from the courts. Exploring the flaws in the defense of
Judge Randa’s sentencing—and filling the gaps in Judge Wood’s
opinion—helps us fill in some of the larger dynamics of our constitutional commitment to equality.
I.
At first glance, the impermissibility of national origin discrimination seems firmly ensconced in the law across a range of
jurisprudential settings. Justices of both the right and the left on
the Supreme Court have repeatedly enumerated national origin
among the criteria triggering strict scrutiny pursuant to the
Equal Protection Clause without a hint of protest or controversy.16
It is also among the forbidden grounds included in Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on private employment

16 For statements to this effect, see Peña-Rodriguez v Colorado, 137 S Ct 855, 883
(2017) (Alito dissenting); City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 440
(1985); United States Railroad Retirement Board v Fritz, 449 US 166, 174 (1980).
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discrimination.17 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has promulgated regulations defining its antidiscrimination mandate in broad terms to cover “the denial of equal
employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her
ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group.”18 And at the international level, the bar on national origin
discrimination is confirmed in the leading international human
rights instrument.19
Yet even within this seemingly solid carapace of legal authorities, strains show. Seeming consensus masks practical difficulties and conceptual confusion. Firm prohibitions yield because of
exceptions and obvious pathways for circumvention. The actual
justifications for and force of the initial legal prohibitions remain
tenebrous. Across all these domains of law, the concept of national
origin stands in uneasy relation to other prohibited grounds in
ways that render its independent force uncertain. It simply isn’t
clear whether and how it is akin to or subsumed by other protected grounds.
Take first the example of international law. The idea of national origin discrimination in international law was initially proposed by a Soviet delegation to the United Nations. Likely, the
Soviets acted out of a concern with their own domestic travails
with national minorities. Their suggestion, though, prompted
largely “misunderstanding” and “confusion” from the get-go.20
Other delegates, a touch baffled, understood the term to be synonymous with citizenship, and so not demarcating any new category.21 Recent commentary on national origin discrimination in
international law confirms the ambiguity. It suggests that the
term can be understood in two different ways—either as “equivalent to citizenship [in which case] discrimination is of course not
illegal,” or alternatively “in a sociological sense [that] overlaps
with race,” which is illegal.22 National origin discrimination would

17

42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
29 CFR § 1606.1.
19 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 26, 999 UNTS 171,
TIAS No 92-908 (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force for the United States Sept 8, 1992) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “national or social origin”).
20 Egbert Willem Vierdag, The Concept of Discrimination in International Law: With
Special Reference to Human Rights 100–01, 101 n 81 (Cambridge 2012).
21 Id at 99.
22 Natan Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law 37–38
(Martinus Nijhoff 2003).
18
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thus be impermissible only when it operated as a substitute for
race discrimination. On this view, it is hardly clear that national
origin supplies a separate prohibited term, rather than merely a
prophylactic supplement to mitigate circumvention of the racial
discrimination bar.
International law’s protection against national origin discrimination is further complicated (although hardly neutered) by
the absence of any positive right to a nationality in international
law.23 That is, while the latter body of law constrains denaturalization and prohibits certain discriminatory terms in citizenship
access, states still maintain extensive control over whether and
when to recognize persons as citizens under international law.24
A state’s largely unfettered power to decline to recognize a person’s membership in the polity is obviously a potent substitute for
its inability to discriminate on the basis of citizenship.25 If national origin is subsumed within the category of citizenship, it will
thus have little independent effect.
Next, consider the inclusion of national origin in the crown
jewel of US antidiscrimination law, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. Again, this inclusion has not produced certainty or clarity.
The legislative history of the statute is “unilluminating,” and suggests that “[t]he national origin term ended up in Title VII because
it was part of the ‘boilerplate’ [ ] language” contained in earlier
regulations and statutes.26 Confusingly, legislators appear to have
intended to capture both the idea of ancestry and also country of
origin by the use of that term.27 In light of this origin, perhaps it
is unsurprising that courts have interpreted the term inconsistently. Some courts have construed it to extend to groups, such as
Acadians and Roma, who are not traditionally defined in terms of
an origin nation-state.28 Their approach instead has been consistent with the view that “national origin” and “ancestry” are
synonymous for statutory purposes.29
23

See Selya Benhabib, Exile, Statelessness, and Migration: Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isaiah Berlin 112 (Princeton 2018).
24 See Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 Am J Intl L 694,
695–96, 714–16 (2011).
25 See, for example, Joseph Allchin, Why Hindu Nationalists Trialed India’s Citizenship Law in Assam (NY Rev Books, Jan 6, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/QJ8E-CS2C.
26 Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 805, 807, 817–21 (1994).
27 Barbara Lindemann Schlei and Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law
807 (2d ed 1983)
28 See Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice at 825–26 (cited in note 26).
29 Espinoza v Farah Manufacturing Co, 414 US 86, 89 (1973).
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Pressing the statute in a different direction, challenges to
“English-only” policies have become a staple of Title VII national
origin litigation.30 This approach treats national origin as a proxy
for ethnicity or perhaps citizenship. In response to these challenges, some judges have criticized the EEOC’s gloss on the statute to extend to language-based discrimination as going beyond
the law’s outer perimeter.31 It is likely that adverse action on the
basis of language (or linguistic competence) will often be the only
available action on the basis of national origin. A narrowing construction of the statutory prohibition that eliminates these theories
of liability will thus be tantamount to an excision of national origin
discrimination from the statute. In short, the statutory law of national origin discrimination is just as conceptually underpowered
and confused as its international-law counterpart.
Finally, let us take a broad view of the constitutional jurisprudence developed under the Equal Protection Clause, reserving
a more intensive look at the case law for a moment. This allows
us to flag yet more ambiguities and confusions. As a threshold
matter, there is no clear account in the Court’s jurisprudence of
why national origin is included in the list of suspect classifications. There is not one case in which the Court has explained why
national origin is a salient trait for equal protection purposes
analogous to race or gender. Cases from the late nineteenth century that implicate the concept often involve Chinese litigants,
but do not explain how animus against the latter is properly characterized.32 The result is, again, confusion. The Court that had
recently characterized anti-Chinese discrimination in terms of
national origin will then turn around and frame the same kind of
30 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 Nw U L Rev
1689, 1699–1700 (2006) (“From 1996 to 2000, complaints lodged with the EEOC concerning English-only rules quintupled. National origin–related complaints, which often include
a challenge to an English-only rule, today represent the fastest growing source of complaints to the EEOC.”) (citation omitted).
31 See Reyes v Pharma Chemie, Inc, 890 F Supp 2d 1147, 1158 (D Neb 2012) (“Even
under Title VII, language itself is not a protected class. Nor are language and national
origin interchangeable.”).
32 See, for example, Lau v Nichols, 414 US 563, 569 (1974) (resolving a challenge to
a municipality’s failure to provide Chinese-origin students with sufficient resources on
statutory grounds); Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 373–74 (1886) (finding selective enforcement of a criminal statute against “Chinese subjects” to be “unjust and illegal”). See
also United States v Wong Kim Ark, 169 US 649, 705 (1898) (finding that Chinese persons
born in the United States are natural-born citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Wong Wing v United States, 163 US 228, 238 (1896) (invalidating, on due process grounds,
a statute that subjected only Chinese nationals amenable to deportation to a regime of
hard labor).
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discrimination in terms of race.33 If the terms are synonymous,
though, why muddy the waters by deploying both? I am reminded
of a colleague who, after almost a decade, still confuses me with
the other South Asian member of my faculty. Moreover, most of
these cases predate modern formulations of equal protection doctrine with its infrastructure of suspect classes and strict scrutiny.
So it is perhaps unrealistic to expect a fully formed theoretical
account of national origin as a category of unconstitutional discrimination that is clearly separate from or overlapping with race
discrimination.
But matters do not become clearer once the contemporary
doctrinal apparatus is in place. Rather than being carefully analyzed in more modern cases, national origin is simply offered as
one item in a formulaic tally of suspect classifications.34 It is stipulated, not deduced, as constitutional law.
Perhaps the closest the Court has come to considering the basis for national origin discrimination is a case involving a challenge to preemptory challenges exercised against “Latino” jurors
on the basis of their bilingual ability.35 The Court’s opinion there
is not illuminating. It does say in passing that “it may well be that
for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, [ ] proficiency
in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a
surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”36 It is hard
to read this, though, as a decisive gloss on national origin discrimination, especially since “Latino” is not even a nationality.
Worse, when the Court does address the normative grounds
for including national origin as a suspect class, it does so in a way
that invites yet more confusion. For instance, an early invocation
of national origin as an impermissible ground in a concurring
opinion cites back to an earlier precedent concerning a racial
category—as if the latter were synonymous with the former.37

33

Ah Sin v Wittman, 198 US 500, 507 (1905) (characterizing such discrimination as
a matter of “race or class prejudice”).
34 It is perhaps telling that the leading casebook on constitutional law does not address
national origin discrimination at all. See generally Geoffrey Stone, Louis Seidman, Cass Sunstein, Mark Tushnet, and Pamela Karlan, Constitutional Law (Aspen 8th ed 2019).
35 Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 355 (1991). For a discussion of Hernandez as
a national origin discrimination case, see Jenny Rivera, An Equal Protection Standard for
National Origin Subclassifications: The Context That Matters, 82 Wash L Rev 897, 913–
14 (2007).
36 Hernandez, 500 US at 371.
37 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart concurring), citing Oyama v California, 332 US 633, 644–46 (1948). Oyama framed the
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Across a range of different jurisdictional levels, in short, the
law of national origin discrimination is characterized by yet another sort of double movement—albeit one that is distinct and different from the double movement I traced in Judge Wood’s
Figueroa opinion. On the one hand, national origin is enumerated
among the well-established and durably impermissible bases for
state or private action. On the other hand, once one scratches the
surface, there is a puzzling lack of content to the concept. It was
apparently not clear to the drafters of legal texts (be they treaties,
statutes, or judicial opinions) exactly why they were including national origin among the enumeration of forbidden grounds. In application, a tendency manifests to assimilate impermissible national origin discrimination into the putatively distinct categories
of racial discrimination or citizenship bias. It’s hard to avoid the
sense that “national origin” is a legacy term, included in antidiscrimination measures through a mechanical borrowing of earlier
texts.
Compounding the problem is an absence of scholarship on national origin discrimination as such (rather than, say, many excellent studies on discrimination against Latinx or Asian Americans).38 An element of the central working structures of equality
law, in sum, is characterized not only by a puzzling internal tension but also by a startling lack of scrutiny from the academy.
II.
This gap would be uninteresting, of course, if it were the case
that national origin discrimination—however that term is defined—were not a persistent phenomenon, resurfacing with some
regularity as a moral and legal problem for the polity. But the
situation is rather different. A review of even the unrepresentative body of Supreme Court cases suggests that something akin
to national origin discrimination has been a persistent feature of
our law. More troublingly, the ambivalences described above have
allowed the Court to obscure or avoid its significance. Read critically, the fugitive and fragmentary jurisprudence of national
origin discrimination is a history of silences, evasions, and even
moral catastrophes. Doctrinal ambiguity, as critical race scholars
question then presented as “whether discrimination between citizens on the basis of their
racial descent, as revealed in this case, is justifiable.” Oyama, 332 US at 646.
38 See generally, for example, Angelo N. Ancheta, Race, Rights and the Asian American Experience (Rutgers 2006) (arguing that framing discrimination in the US according
to the Black-white model ignores the experience of Asian Americans).
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have noted, can facilitate a jurisprudence in which relatively vulnerable and socially marginalized minorities persistently lose
out. Their claims fail because of courts’ ability to opportunistically
(re)characterize their claims in multiple ways—each time assigning the label that ensures a loss.39 Hence, the absence of clarity
about national origin discrimination that I’ve documented above
translates fairly effectively into an absence of clear regressive or
otherwise troubling effects.
To begin with, I should be clear that I am not positing that
all claims of national origin discrimination will fail or have failed.
A powerful counterexample, located at the beginning of the equal
protection tradition, concerned a challenge to the discriminatory
enforcement of a San Francisco laundry ordinance against “Chinese subjects,” which the Court held to be both “unjust and illegal.”40 Yet even in this case, the Court characterized the municipality’s distinction as a “hostility to the race and nationality to
which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is
not justified.”41 Race and nationality, that is, stood side by side as
seemingly close substitutes. This statement must also be read
against its contemporary context. The Court had recently identified discrimination against “the newly emancipated negroes [sic]
. . . [as] the evil to be remedied” by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause and had refused to extend that provision’s reach beyond that class (although it would subsequently do
so).42 Subsequent cases treated the San Francisco laundry case as
one concerning “race-based decisionmaking,”43 thus omitting or
suppressing its attention to national origin. To the extent that
national origin discrimination can be found in the early days of
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, then, it was easily

39 The seminal version of this argument is Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U Chi Legal F 139. Professor Crenshaw
noted “the equation of racism with what happens to the Black middle-class or to Black
men, and the equation of sexism with what happens to white women,” and demonstrated
ways in which those in an intersecting class found themselves without remedies in specific
cases. Id at 152.
40 Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 374 (1886).
41 Id (emphasis added).
42 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36, 81 (1872).
43 Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 914 (1995). Other recent citations of the laundry
case cite it for its peroration to the franchise, and do not mention the race/nationality
distinction. See, for example, Abbott v Perez, 138 S Ct 2305, 2360 (2018) (Sotomayor
dissenting).
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conflated with (or assimilated into) the more familiar class of
race-based measures.
In the larger span of potential applications of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has continued to oscillate between treating instances of state action picking out individuals based on
some theory of national origin as race cases or alternatively as
national origin cases. On most occasions, the Court’s formal or
informal taxonomical choice has disadvantaged the minority litigant seeking protection from aversive state action. I say “formal
or informal” because in some instances the force of “national origin”
as a classificatory scheme can be discerned even though the case is
formally labeled as one turning on a racial classification.
Rather than being comprehensive, I highlight here three
lines of legal precedent, as well as one phenomenon that lies outside the reach of constitutional equality law. All of these features
of the legal landscape are noteworthy for their immediate practical salience and their historical resonance. The common thread
tying them together is an ambiguous entangling of race and nationality to the persistent detriment of the minority claimants.
First, in a pair of early twentieth-century cases, the Court
explained that an amendment to the Naturalization Act of 187044
clarified that “the Naturalization Act ‘shall apply to aliens, being
free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.’”45 In the first of the cases, the Court held
that “white person” comprised “only a person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race,” and so excluded Japanese
nationals.46 In the second case, it held that an Indian national,
while indisputably “Caucasian,” nonetheless fell beyond the Act
as read “in accordance with the understanding of the common
man.”47 This second decision has received attention principally for
its rejection of “scientific” conceptions of race.48 Despite this rejection, the Court still allowed some of the normative implications of
turn-of-the-eighteenth-century racial hierarchies to seep back

44 Act of July 14, 1870, ch 254 § 7, 16 Stat 254, 256, as amended by Act of Feb 18,
1875, 18 Stat 316, 318, formerly codified at 8 USC § 359.
45 United States v Thind, 261 US 204, 207 (1923).
46 Ozawa v United States, 260 US 178, 197 (1922).
47 Thind, 261 US at 214–15.
48 Id at 210 (“The Aryan theory as a racial basis seems to be discredited by most, if
not all, modern writers on the subject of ethnology.”). See also Donald Braman, Of Race
and Immutability, 46 UCLA L Rev 1375, 1406 (1999) (arguing that in Thind, “the Court
dismissed racial science”); Ian F. Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of
Race 6 (NYU 1997).
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into the analysis.49 The Indian national in that case lost his bid
for citizenship because a “scientific” conception of “race” was
superseded by a demotic taxonomy grounded in a loose conception
of national origin:
The words of familiar speech, which were used by the original
framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of
man whom they knew as white. The immigration of that day
was almost exclusively from the British Isles and Northwestern Europe, whence they and their forbears had come. When
they extended the privilege of American citizenship to “any
alien, being a free white person” it was these immigrants—
bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh—and their kind
whom they must have had affirmatively in mind. . . . It was
the descendants of these, and other immigrants of like origin,
[i.e., from the same nation] who constituted the white population of the country when § 2169, reenacting the naturalization test of 1790, was adopted; and there is no reason to
doubt, with like intent and meaning.50
A reasonable interpretation of this passage is that national
origin, filtered through a demotic perspective, is being called on to
do the (literally) exclusionary work that “scientific” conceptions of
race have failed to perform given the facts at bar.51 It is also consistent with historical analysis of early twentieth-century US “racialism” as an ideology that construed “race [ ] as an indivisible essence that included not only biology but also culture, morality, and
intelligence.”52 This rather baggy conception of race is capacious
enough to be implemented though the invocation of national origin.
The latter becomes in short order a ready-to-hand substitute for
race in the larger project of maintaining social stratification.

49 See Khiara M. Bridges, The Dangerous Law of Biological Race, 82 Fordham L Rev
21, 44 (2013) (“Given the fact that the belief that races were biologically distinct entities
was a widely held, infrequently disputed position when Thind was decided, the ordinary
conception of race incorporated biological race.”). See also Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by
Law, 97 Cal L Rev 633, 637, 687–88 (2009) (arguing that “science and common knowledge
are codependent: common-knowledge understandings of race often have their foundation
in science”).
50 Thind, 261 US at 213–14 (emphases added).
51 Indeed, in a more recent case, the Court examined the legislative history of 42
USC § 1981 and concluded that understandings of “race” overlapped with a sense of national origins. Saint Francis College v Al-Khazraji, 481 US 604, 612–13 (1987).
52 Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of “Race” in Twentieth-Century America, 83 J Am Hist 44, 48 (1996).
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The second line of cases concerns the mass internment of
Japanese-American citizens and noncitizens in 1942 in the wake
of the Pearl Harbor bombing.53 President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
pivotal executive order targeted persons of “Japanese ancestry”
for a regime of curfews, forced evacuations, and finally internment in distant and dismaying camps.54 The internment produced
three cases, the most notorious of which is Korematsu v United
States.55 Korematsu, of course, is also well known to lawyers as
the doctrinal origin of strict scrutiny for racial classifications.56
It is a rather striking irony that this doctrinal source for strict
scrutiny of racial classifications arises in a context polluted by a
deep confusion between the categories of race and nation. Relevant here, Korematsu concerned a government classification
predicated on the threat from certain nationalities—and yet the
term “national origin” simply does not appear in the course of Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion. The obvious centrality of national origin to a government policy of interning Japanese Americans (but not other Asian Americans such as Chinese Americans,
Korean Americans, etc., to say nothing of German Americans or
Italian Americans) is registered only fleetingly in the opinion. But
it receives no analytic attention, and there is no careful consideration of whether or how national origin might be different from race.
To the contrary, the slippage between race and national
origin proved pivotal to the Court’s ability to uphold the internment policy. Writing for the majority, Justice Black argued that
the existence of “members of the group who retained loyalties to
Japan” justified the undifferentiated aggregation and adverse
treatment of all “those of Japanese origin.”57 In other words, the
military was entitled to rely on the category of “Japanese Americans” because of the putative influence of loyalties to a specific
nation. In the absence of this logic of shared national origin—or
at least on the basis of an imputed shared national origin on the
basis of ethnicity—the challenged internment policy would not
have been sufficiently tailored to survive strict scrutiny. And yet
at the same time that it relied on the internees’ shared national

53 For an account of that internment, see Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 Mich L Rev 47, 57–61 (2019).
54 7 Fed Reg 3964–69 (May 28, 1942).
55 323 US 214 (1944).
56 Id at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect [and] . . . subject [ ] to the most rigid scrutiny.”).
57 Id at 218–19.
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origin, Korematsu framed the legal question before the Court as
a matter of “legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group.”58 Race and nationality are used as almost interchangeable terms in Justice Black’s analysis—and the small
gap between them provided the Court with the rhetorical basis
for its holding: No racial discrimination obtained because of the
logical force of a nationality classification. In practical effect, differences in national origin provided the Court with a justification
for and an authorization of racial discrimination, putatively
within the operation of strict scrutiny.59
A premise of the opinion is thus that national origin is a narrowly tailored instrument for achieving the government’s legitimate goal. In this logic, national origin cannot be merely a synonym for race in the manner it was in the citizenship cases. If
national origin was a mere synonym for race, then it could not
serve as a justification for racial discrimination. National origin
rather could operate as a conceptual instrument to mitigate the
constitutional problem catalyzed by racial classification only because “Japanese origin” was taken by the Court to provide a
meaningful proxy for security risk in a way that (presumably)
race would not. This deft dance between race and national origin
barely registers in the Court’s opinion. All the same, it is key to
its outcome.
We know now, of course, that the key government decisionmakers in the White House and the Armed Forces well understood that national origin was no such thing. We know that it instead worked as a normatively freighted lever for social stratification and official subordination.60 In a doctrinal context,
however, strategic invocation of national origin at the justificatory axis of the argument provided a way to suppress that
58

Id at 216 (emphasis added).
It is only fair to observe that Korematsu’s majority opinion can be powerfully critiqued for the frailty of its narrow tailoring analysis. Its moral and legal flaw, that is,
abides in its deference to military judgments—and not in the conflation of race and nation.
Perhaps a reason that this critique is not more common today is that so many judges are
so eager to show deference to security-related judgments precisely in the way that Korematsu did.
Also, consider why Korematsu did not simply deny that any race-based classification
was at issue, such that strict scrutiny would not apply. It is hard to know, but perhaps the
Court’s appetite for euphemism only went so far.
60 See Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese
Americans 108, 110–24, 238 (Harvard 2001) (documenting Roosevelt’s motivations regarding internment and his racist views about the Japanese generally); Richard Reeves, Infamy:
The Shocking Story of the Japanese Internment in World War II 32–38 (Picador 2015).
59
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dynamic, and to launder invidious preferences into state-sponsored coercion.
The use of “national origin” as an analytic tool in Korematsu
must also be viewed in light of the Court’s earlier statements in
the Hirabayashi v United States61 case.62 In the latter, the Court
underscored at length Japanese Americans’ “solidarity” with each
other, the failure of their “assimilation as an integral part of the
white population,” their teaching of “Japanese nationalistic propaganda” to their children, and (most remarkably) the “irritation”
of legalized discrimination, which “may well have tended to increase their isolation, and in many instances their attachments
to Japan and its institutions.”63 National origin had thus already
been infused by the Court with negative judgments about the
moral and social inferiority of Japanese Americans. It was thus
ready to be deployed as a racialized marker of alterity. But for the
context and the outcome, one can almost admire the supple judicial legerdemain whereby this same concept is flipped to serve as
a balm to mitigate the grievance of a racial classification in
Korematsu.
The third line of cases involves instances in which the Court
has treated a national origin classification as a racial classification. Although this would superficially seem to repudiate the
moral error of the Korematsu judgment, in fact its effect is to
warrant a similar (although far less iniquitous) imposition of disproportionate harms on a vulnerable, socially stratified minority.
As critical race scholars might have predicted, the subordinated
minority class loses when national origin is used to hide race
effects (as in the internment cases), when it is used to explain race
(as in the naturalization cases), and also when national origin is
recognized as race’s substitute. If the first two lines of cases
demonstrate the ways in which the very idea of “racial animus” is
a slippery and porous one64—especially when placed in juxtaposition with the idea of national origin—then the third line of cases
shows how the idea of national origin can be pressed to collapse
into race to vulnerable minorities’ detriment.

61

320 US 81 (1943).
See Huq, 118 Mich L Rev at 59 (cited in note 53) (describing Hirabayashi as providing pivotal context for the Korematsu decision).
63 Hirabayashi, 320 US at 96–98.
64 This is a theme explored in Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 Cornell L Rev 1211, 1240–65 (2018).
62
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In a number of recent cases, the Court has been confronted
by minorities arguing that a classification should be upheld because it was not on racial grounds but rather legitimately tracked
the contours of a political community. In Rice v Cayetano,65 for
example, the Court held that, in using a Hawaiians-only voting
qualification for electing the trustee positions of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the state used ancestry as a proxy for race, and
therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment.66 The Court explained that this measure “treat[ed] the early Hawaiians as a distinct people” and so “used ancestry as a racial definition and for a
racial purpose.”67 Rice is not directly concerned with national
origin. It is instructive rather as an instance in which political
efforts to recognize a distinct political community—defined in reference to a point in time when it could be ranked as a distinct
nation—collapses into a racial classification. This in turn allegedly fails to show the constitutionally necessary “respect” to all
persons.68
A similar logic can be glimpsed briefly in Justice Samuel
Alito’s opinion for the Court in the recent case of Adoptive Couple
v Baby Girl,69 which suggested that the Indian Child Welfare Act’s
provisions protecting the children of enrolled tribal members
“would raise equal protection concerns” if applied to a child with
a “remote” Native “ancestor.”70 As perceptive commentators immediately noted, treating federal-law distinctions between Natives and non-Natives as constitutionally suspect would “almost
completely eliminate existing Indian law.”71 It would also run
athwart the historical evidence of “multiple historical meanings
of ‘nation,’ ‘tribe,’ and ‘Indian,’” which show that “race and political status are inextricably entangled in defining Indian status.”72
Again, were the Court to take the step that Justice Alito gestured
toward, it would treat a category characterized by overlapping
65

528 US 495 (2000).
Id at 514–25. Under state law, a “Hawaiian” was “any descendant of the aboriginal
peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to reside in Hawaii.” Hawaii Rev Stat § 10-2.
67 Rice, 528 US at 515.
68 Id at 517.
69 570 US 637 (2013).
70 Id at 655–56.
71 Marcia Zug, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Two-and-a-Half Ways to Destroy Indian
Law, 111 Mich L Rev First Impressions 46, 49–50 (2013).
72 Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitutional Meanings, 70 Stan L Rev 1025, 1034 (2018).
66
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understandings of national origin and race as dominated by the
latter. So doing, it would predictably and substantially retard the
interests of a vulnerable and socially marginalized minority
group.73
Fourth and finally, I want to draw attention to a way in which
national origin discrimination plays a large role in American public life essentially without any meaningful constitutional limitation. The continued force of national origin categories in this way
gives the lie to the notion that such discrimination is beyond the
constitutional pale in this first instance. To the contrary, it turns
out to be constitutive of becoming an American.
Since 1924, the immigration statutes of the United States
have employed national origin as a criterion for selecting among
potential new residents (and, by implication, new citizens). The
1924 law itself installed a system of national origin quotas.74 This
supplemented the racial criterion for citizenship that had been in
place since 1790.75 Because the quotas were calibrated in terms of
the 1920 demographic composition of the United States, they
worked to preserve then-existing ratios of racial and ethnic
groups.76 The use of national origin as a criterion for sorting
among applications for entrance to the nation had already been
upheld in challenges77 to the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 188278 and
1884.79 Such quotas persisted as a central, architectural element
of federal immigration law until 1965.80 There is nothing obvious
or necessary about their role in immigration law, however. Look

73 Id at 1074 (characterizing the effect of Justice Alito’s suggestion as “not [ ] to repudiate the past but to revive it, reinstating the assimilationist imperative at the root of
much disastrous federal policy”).
74 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub L No 68-139, 43 Stat 153, 155–56, 159–60 (prescribing rights of immigrants to United States visas). The effective date for the national origin
system for determining immigration quotas was delayed until 1929. Edward P. Hutchinson,
Legislative History of American Immigration Policy 1798–1965 470 (U Pa 1981).
75 Act of Mar 26, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat 103–04 (establishing conditions and procedures for
naturalization).
76 Helen F. Eckerson, Immigration and National Origins, 367 Annals Am Acad Pol
& Soc Sci 4, 7–8 (1966).
77 See Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 603 (1889) (“That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude
aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.”); Fong
Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698, 705 (1893), quoting Chae Chan Ping, 130 US at
603–04.
78 Pub L No 47-126, 22 Stat 58.
79 Pub L No 48-220, 23 Stat 115.
80 Act of Oct 3, 1965, Pub L No 89-236, 79 Stat 911, codified as amended in various
sections of Title 8 (abolishing national origin quotas).
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north and one sees a country that has long employed a pointsbased system that emphasizes skills—a system that pays scant
attention to nationality.81
Instead, the role of immigration quotas has always been inward facing: They formed the nation first in literal demographic
terms and then in more subtle psychological terms by reflecting
and confirming shared senses of racial (white) identity. Enacted
with the support of a “network of influential white nationalists,”82
they were crafted “to maintain the America and Americans of the
past.”83 According to the authoritative account of historian Mae
M. Ngai, national origin quotas reflected not just “race-based nativism, which favored the ‘Nordics’ of northern and western Europe over the ‘undesirable races’ of eastern and southern Europe,”
they also nurtured “a constellation of reconstructed racial categories, in which race and nationality—concepts that had been
loosely conflated since the nineteenth century—disaggregated
and realigned in new and uneven ways.”84 National origin quotas
in immigration law, Ngai argues, inflected the racial self-understandings of Americans by confirming the existence of a “consanguine white race” of Americans.85 Consistent with this account,
immigrant groups such as Italian Americans campaigned
through the 1940s and 1950s to abolish a national origin quota
system precisely because it expressed a public judgment of them
as “culturally, and perhaps racially, undesirable.”86 National
origin discrimination against the foreigner, we see, plainly and
painfully rebounds into the domestic quarter.
National origin discrimination remains part of the immigration laws today. Indeed, it plays much the same purifying,
81 See Charles M. Beach, Alan G. Green, and Christopher Worswick, Impacts of the
Point System and Immigration Policy Levers on Skill Characteristics of Canadian Immigrants, 27 Rsrch Labor Econ 349, 349–51 (2007).
82 Elizabeth F. Cohen, Illegal: How America’s Lawless Immigration Regime Threatens Us All 91 (Basic 2020). For a more nuanced account, see Son-Thierry Ly and Patrick
Weil, The Antiracist Origin of the Quota System, 77 Soc Rsrch 45, 47, 48–53 (2010) (arguing that the “goal for the quota system was to restrict immigration efficiently and mathematically but to end racial discrimination against Asiatics [sic] by establishing a system
that would include all foreign countries”) (emphasis omitted).
83 Margot K. Mendelson, Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S. Immigration
Courts, 119 Yale L J 1012, 1021 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
84 Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J Am Hist 67, 69 (1999).
85 Id at 70 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Matthew Jacobson, Whiteness of a
Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Harvard 1998).
86 Danielle Battisti, The American Committee on Italian Migration, Anti-Communism, and Immigration Reform, 31 J Am Ethnic Hist 11, 19 (2012).
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expressive function that it did until 1965. Perhaps the leading example is the so-called “travel ban” installed in January 2017
against nationals of largely Muslim-majority nations by President Donald Trump.87 The ban was challenged as a violation of
religious neutrality,88 but upheld by the Supreme Court.89 I have
criticized that judgment as legally flawed and morally execrable
elsewhere, and will not rehash those points here.90 Its relevance
here is for what was off the page rather than its manifold errors
on the page: nowhere in the challenges to the ban and the various
judicial opinions that it produced is there even a scintilla of reflection on the constitutional permissibility of national origin discrimination in immigration law. Even though equal protection
law has been applied with full rigor to the citizenship-acquisition
elements of the immigration code,91 the prohibition of national
origin discrimination that obtains in other policy domains simply
finds no purchase at the border.92 By force of brute assumption, it
is deemed constitutional.
No explanation is needed or has yet been tendered for this
constitutional caesura. A fortiori, the more subtle (yet likely more
numerically consequential) disparate impacts of enforcement-related changes raise no legal red flag.93 The jurisprudential legacy
of the Chinese Exclusion Acts in this regard is so overwhelming
that it can travel onward through doctrinal time without even
casual mention or explanation.94
In summary, national origin discrimination continues unabated in immigration law, where it has the longest and most powerful pedigree in shaping US demographics and attitudes toward
race and ethnicity to conform with white ethnonationalist
norms.95 More plainly stated, it is race’s alter ego at the border.

87 See Huq, 118 Mich L Rev at 61–68 (cited in note 53) (providing an extensive account of the various iterations of the ban).
88 See, for example, Hawaii v Trump, 241 F Supp 3d 1119, 1136 (D Hawaii 2017)
(noting “significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus driving the promulgation
of the Executive Order”).
89 Trump v Hawaii, 138 S Ct 2392, 2423 (2018).
90 See generally Huq, 118 Mich L Rev 47 (cited in note 53).
91 See Sessions v Morales-Santana, 137 S Ct 1678, 1692–93 (2017) (invalidating provision on the basis of gender equality jurisprudence).
92 The leading case is Narenji v Civiletti, 617 F2d 745, 748 (DC Cir 1979).
93 See Sabrina Tavernese, Immigrant Population Growth in the U.S. Slows to a
Trickle (NY Times, Sept 26, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/H9SC-5ZJT.
94 See text accompanying note 81.
95 In a similar vein, see Daniel Denvir, All-American Nativism: How the Bipartisan
War on Immigrants Explains Politics as We Know It 11–12 (Verso 2020) (“Nativism is . . .

2416

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:2397

At the same time, ameliorative programs aimed at protecting vulnerable minorities previously organized on national grounds falter or fall on the ground that they disrespect individual citizens.
Laced more deeply into the historical roots of equal protection
doctrine, we find not judicial scrutiny of such distinctions but instead the judicial deployment of national origin as a rhetorical
tool for whittling away the constitutional barriers against racial
distinctions. Rather than race’s alter ego, it is here racism’s enabling escutcheon.
In sum, by considering the Court’s jurisprudence in the large,
we can see yet another sort of double movement of national origin
discrimination—one that is quite distinct from the double movement in the Figueroa decision described at the threshold. It is at
once a sword against the diverse immigrant, plaintively seeking
aid at the threshold, and also a shield against the redistributive
claims of the colonized indigene.
This Janus-faced doctrine of national origin discrimination is,
in other words, not one that has redounded to the benefit of the vulnerable racial and ethnic minorities—those, one might once have
supposed, who ought to receive the “special care” of equality under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.96 Its facility for delighting
other, more powerful, interest groups needs little elaboration.
III.
National origin is not what it seems, then, so far as the constitutional law of equality is concerned. But then what is it, and
what should it be? An Essay of this form is no place for articulating a theory of nationality for constitutional law. But I would be
equally awry in honoring the robust and rich intellectual legacy
of Judge Wood if I had nothing positive to say on this score, and
if there was no ground on which her own distinctive double movement in Figueroa, which involved gesturing toward the possibility
of discrimination without the need to condemn the district court
judge, could not be glossed.97
To think about “national origin,” it is useful to have in mind
a sense of what a “nation” might be. So let’s start there, even if
the analysis must be almost comically brief. (Consider this a

a concept that allows us to rethink racism itself as a bedrock nationalist population politics
that functions to control the movement and status of racialized others.”).
96 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US at 78.
97 See text accompanying notes 1–10.
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promissory note for future work, if you must). On the standard
view in political theory, a nation is a kind of community, albeit a
necessarily “imagined” one, to take up a much-abused yet perennially useful phrase.98 It is almost never formed through “spontaneous processes of ethnic self-definition,” but rather via the “exigencies of power.”99 Central to such processes is often the creation
and propagation of an “‘ideological’ myth of origins and descent.”100 The role of ideology can be understood in more or less
purposive ways. Professor Ernest Gellner, for example, famously
distinguished between a “cultural” definition of the nation in
which people are united by “a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating,” and a “voluntaristic” one in which “nations are artefacts of men’s [sic] convictions and loyalties and solidarities.”101 This reflects a distinction
between an inherited and a consciously assumed ideology of national origin.
I am not sure we need here to choose between Gellner’s options. Whichever view we take, it seems likely that the sense of
belonging to a nation (that is, having a national origin) involves
both a historical and also a dynamic, ongoing process of affirmation and reflection among the national group, and in particular
between the group and the state. The nation is a matter of ongoing, active, and inexorably political self-conception, as much as it
is a historical object. As such, its basic terms can never be settled
finally as beyond reformulation and debate. The idea of the nation
is instead mutative, dialogic, never as fixed as its participants like
and need to imagine.102 Such a dynamic can over time yield different arcs. In comparison to some historical baseline, we might see
moments of generosity resting on the recognition of widely shared

98

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism 4–7 (Verso rev ed 2006) (emphasizing the cultural roots of nationalism).
To be clear, Professor Anderson’s account—which places stress on the role of print cultures—has been forcefully challenged as a covering law. See, for example, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse 19–22, 50–51
(Minnesota 1993).
99 David Miller, The Ethical Significance of Nationality, 98 Ethics 647, 654 (1988).
100 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations 147 (Oxford 1986).
101 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 7 (Cornell 1983). See also id at 53–58.
102 Hence the perpetual possibility of imagining the nation’s absence. See, for example, John Lennon, Imagine, on Imagine (Apple Records 1971) (“Imagine there’s no
countries . . . .”).
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human commonalities.103 Or else we might perceive a rebarbative
and atavistic gaze, looking out to find only barbarians beyond the
gates.
To understand the role that national origin discrimination
can and should play in our constitutional law, therefore, we
should start by looking at our own conception of American national identity, and the contrastive function of other nationalities
in its rhetorical logic. To understand the normative force of aversive assignment of “Mexican” or “Japanese” as a label, we must
start by understanding how these terms are used through subtle
counterpoint to define the American.
A theme running through the examples canvassed in this Essay has been the role that constitutional law, and in particular
the constitutional law of equality, has played in this dynamic,
specifically through its distinction between an American national
origin and its alien alternatives. Constitutional law here has been
an engine of, not a friction upon, social subordination.
Let me offer in closing a possible lesson, which can be extracted from these examples and the various criticisms that I
have made: the idea of national origin as a suspect class is a salutary recognition of the possibility that a dominant social group,
commanding the reins of federal government in general and the
immigration power in particular, will employ that power in ways
that either narrow the gyre of national belonging, or else re-enact
domestic prejudices nurtured in the belly of racial or ethnic ferments. Often, this exercise will use the rhetorical terms of national origin discrimination. The latter’s inclusion in the enumeration of suspect classes embodies a salutary recognition that
fashioning an American nation is a task that can be furthered
(and often has been furthered) by the maligning and suppression
of “other” nations. These can often be crisply discerned in rhetorical juxtaposition to the American nation.
A worthwhile project of equal protection might plausibly be
to guard against the tendency toward subordination in the process of constructing and revising the latter. National origin discrimination, on such an account, would be understood as a pernicious spillover from the fashioning of an American nation.
Foremost among the continuing presupposition conducive to such
spillovers is the misguided assumption that national origin
103 Consider Miller, 98 Ethics at 661 (cited in note 99) (“The universalist case for nationality . . . is that it creates communities with the widest feasible membership, and
therefore with the greatest scope for redistribution in favor of the needy.”).
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discrimination is a logical and innocuous means of organizing immigration law. Simply said, it is neither.
To be sure, our jurisprudence now reads from a different
score. Its melodies suggest that federal courts, as instruments of
some dominant national political coalition,104 are more well-tuned
to campaigns that abet the hatred of others than campaigns that
abate exclusionary nation-making projects. At least if history or
present practice is any guide, they are institutionally maladapted
to this task of equal protection when it comes to minorities defined by perceived or actual national origin. At best, they can nibble at the edges of the problem—as the Figueroa opinion valiantly
did—but they are not well oriented for wholesale course-correction. For that purpose, another form of political mobilization and
change is required.105 In 1924, it took forty-one years to happen.
This time, I hope the wait is shorter.

104 See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Why Judicial Independence Fails, 115 Nw U L Rev
(forthcoming 2021).
105 See Cohen, Illegal at 191–92 (cited in note 82) (underscoring the need for ideological change).

